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Abstract
To moderate speculation in housing market, multiple Asian cities implemented
transaction tax notches on holding period of property. Using administrative trans-
action record of property trading, this paper studies the behavioural response in the
timing of transaction, tax incidence and selection of buyers using the policy changes
in Hong Kong and Singapore. Tax notches on holding period generate significant
tax avoidance bunching in the timing of transaction, and properties were less likely
to be resold even one year after the tax last applies, suggesting plausible crowd out
of transactions. I construct and use a new dataset on government estimated rental
rate to estimate the tax incidence and find evidence that buyers bear significant
tax burden even when tax-free alternatives are available in the market. Evidence
shows that time notches on holding duration produce selection effect among buyers
with different ex ante probability of trade in the taxable holding period. Estimates
suggest that traders on average are willing to wait for 3-4 weeks to avoid 1% of
transaction tax, and each week of delay in transaction would generate loss in the
trading surplus at 0.3 % of property value.
JEL Codes : H22,H26,R31
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1 Introduction
Transaction tax on short holding duration of real estate properties has become a popular
policy tool for governments in east and south east Asia since 2010. Hong Kong, Singapore,
Macau, Taiwan and China introduced transaction tax with rates that vary with holding
duration to deter speculation in the housing market.1 Typically, residential property
transactions are subject to an additional tax from 4-16% of the transaction price if the
property is re-sold within 2 to 4 years. Moreover, the tax rate declines with the time seller
holds the property. One intriguing feature of these tax instruments is that they have a flat
tax rate for an extended period of time (e.g. 6 months), which then sharply decline once
the time threshold is passed and thus constitute salient time notches. While transaction
tax in the property market is present in many countries, there is very little evidence
exist in the public finance literature for how would the market reacts to transaction tax
and particularly those that are designed with objectives beyond raising tax revenue. This
paper provide empirical evidence on understanding how the market react to transaction
tax that have explicit inter-temporal design.
Is transaction tax on short holding duration an appropriate tool to stabilize the hous-
ing market? Speculators and middlemen re-sell faster than home-owners (Bayer et al.,
2011), thus transaction tax on property with short holding duration may impose addi-
tional cost for speculators and create selection of buyers in the market. On the other
hand, it distorts the trading behaviour for all traders including home-owners, by either
the distinct tax avoidance incentives and the potential tax burden for new buyers. Recent
studies in the UK shows that expected transaction tax increase of 1% in the property
market could generate significant re-timing of transactions up to three weeks (Best and
Kleven, 2015). The high transaction tax rate and sharp tax notches implemented in Asia
may thus creates incentives for buyers and sellers to re-time their transaction, and discour-
aged welfare improving transactions if the cost of re-timing is too high.2 In a way similar
to the analysis of capital gain tax, properties could be “locked-in” by the tax, which
could lead to equilibrium effect on transaction price where little is known empirically
(Dai et al., 2008). Using comprehensive administrative record in property transactions
of Hong Kong and Singapore, this paper analyses both the re-timing of transaction and
1Hong Kong, Singapore introduced transaction tax that varies with holding duration in 2010;
Macau and Taiwan had followed through in 2011.
2The design is similar to the long-term versus short-term capital gain tax in the U.S. (Shack-
elford and Verrecchia, 2002; Hurtt and Seida, 2004); Vermont had implemented capital gain tax
on land with a similar declining tax rate with holding duration to deter speculation since 1970s.
Daniels et al. (1986) argues that the capital gain tax on land had restricted supply and raise
land price.; Ontorio had implemented land speculation tax in April 1974 on gains on property
transfer within a 10 year horizon, and as the a fixed percentage of exemption is applied every full
year, it created tax notches each year same as the tax notches analysed in this paper. (Smith,
1976)
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extensive margin crowd out that conceptually constitute the two main sources of welfare
cost of transaction tax with differential tax rate on holding duration.
The government of Hong Kong introduced the “Special Stamp Duty” on 20th Novem-
ber 2010, in which for any residential properties purchased thereafter and resold within
2 years, transaction tax rates of 5-15% were applicable. Using the administrative record
of property transaction in Hong Kong from 2009-2015, I construct the full transaction
history of residential properties from 2009-2015. Comparing properties that are subject
to the “Special Stamp Duty” to those that are not, I provide graphical evidence on sig-
nificant bunching in property transactions when properties were held for exactly 2 years
as the tax rate drop from 5% to 0%. With an regression discontinuity design, I find that
properties subject to the tax are less likely to be traded in the first three years since pur-
chase by 13 percentage points, taking into account of re-timing of transaction. This gives
evidence to the significant reduction in transaction at the extensive margin generated by
the tax even when tax avoidance is feasible, which implies non-trivial cost of transaction
re-timing in the housing market.
Contrasting cash buyers versus buyers who took a mortgage, I first provide evidence
that cash buyers on average are more likely to sell their property in the first year by
4.6% before the reform. Using an event study setup, I find the introduction of Special
Stamp Duty increase the percentage of buyer with mortgage by 5.5%, suggesting the
Special Stamp Duty creates selection among the new buyers. The tax distorts the trad-
ing behaviour on both type of buyers at the intensive margin regarding tax-avoidance
behaviour, while the extensive margin crowd-out is much larger among the cash buyers.
To estimate the tax incidence, I use difference-in-differences strategy comparing trans-
actions carried out under the taxable holding period (before 2 years) to those sold after
the taxable period, as well as its counterpart for properties that are not subject to the
Special Stamp Duty at all. This controls for time-varying factors in the housing market
that may be correlated with the execution time of the tax. To control for property het-
erogeneity, I construct a new data set on government estimated rental rate for properties
being traded in 2009-2015. This makes sure the tax incidence is identified by comparing
properties observationally equivalent but subject to different tax liability, a methodol-
ogy that is close to Besley et al. (2014). I find that with transaction tax rate of 5% the
buyer bear 4% of the burden, but from that on every 5 % additional tax buyer only bear
1%. The significant burden on buyer in a market where tax-free alternative is available
suggests that buyer’s property specific valuation is quantitatively important in housing
transactions.
Under a simple search and match framework with Nash bargaining between buyer
and seller with the option to re-time their transaction similar to that in Slemrod et al.
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(2016), I apply the bunching estimation method in recent public finance literature (Best
and Kleven, 2015; Chetty et al., 2011; Saez, 2010) to identify the time cost of deferring
transaction. Exploiting both the time notches in the “Special Stamp Duty” and the
“Seller’s Stamp Duty” introduced in Singapore at January 2011, where its design is
highly similar to the “Special Stamp Duty” in Hong Kong, I provide estimates on the
time traders are willing to wait to close the contract for tax saving purpose.
I find that traders on average are willing to wait for 3-4 weeks to avoid 1% of tax.
The empirical estimates provide a way to quantify the welfare loss arising from delay
in transactions, and it suggests that each week of delay in transaction would generate
0.3% loss of the average value of the property traded. It also provides quantitative bench-
mark for calibration in macroeconomic models that explicitly model dynamics in housing
market with forward looking buyers and sellers, for example when the market thickness
changes with seasonality or when moving decision is endogenous, that buyers and sellers
have to decide to enter the market now or later (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2014; Ngai and
Sheedy, 2016). Taking into account of both the extensive margin crowd out and the cost
of re-timing transactions, I find that the “Special Stamp Duty” imposed 0.31% of welfare
loss in terms of property values per holding.
The paper is divided as follows. The context of holding duration tax in Hong Kong
and Singapore is described in Section 2. The data and empirical strategy are described
in Sections 3 and 4 respectively, followed by results in Section 5. Section 6 presents the
conceptual framework to understand the welfare effect of the tax. Section 7 present the
estimate of delay cost using the framework. Section 8 conducts welfare analysis. Section
9 discuss some further implications of the tax instrument.
2 Transaction tax on holding duration: Context
Transaction tax on real estate properties are termed stamp duty tax in Hong Kong and
Singapore. It is applicable to both residential and commercial properties, where the tax
rates varies according to the bracket of the transaction price, with progressive marginal
tax rate on price ranges from 1.5 % to 4.25%.3 While the marginal tax rate in each price
bracket differs, there are no notches in which the average tax rate changes at sharp price
cutoffs (e.g. in contrast to that in the UK stamp tax system).
3Figure A.3 plots the tax rate in Hong Kong as a function of price. Leung et al. (2015)
studies the extent of tax avoidance to kinks in the static non-linear tax schedule.
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2.1 Special Stamp duty tax - Hong Kong
With the aim to prohibit speculative purchases and make residential properties more
affordable, the Hong Kong government introduced the Special Stamp Duty (SSD) for
residential units on 20th November 2010.
The Special Stamp Duty regulates that for any residential properties obtained after
20th November 2010, an additional transaction tax would be levied if its next transaction
occur within 24 months from its last transaction.4 For units that are resold within 6
months a tax rate of 15% is charged, 10% for 6-12 months, and 5% for 12-24 months. At
each of these cutoff date, average tax rate drop one day before and after the time notch.5
On 27th October 2012 the government raised the tax rate and increased the holding
duration where the tax is chargeable to 3 years. For properties resold within 6 months,
tax rate of 20% is levied, while for those held for 6-12 months tax rate of 15% is charged.
For properties in which the holding period were from 1 to 3 years, the tax rate become
10%. The tax schedule as a function of holding duration is plotted in Figure 1.
In principle, both buyer and seller are jointly liable for paying tax. In any efficient
bargaining between buyer and seller, buyer paying the tax would maximize the total
surplus of the transaction.6 It is also a common practice in the housing market in Hong
Kong for buyer to pay the stamp duty tax, therefore in the following analysis I implicitly
assume that buyer is responsible for paying the tax.
The Special Stamp Duty was completely unanticipated by the market in both phases,
and apply immediately to those properties traded thereafter.7 Property obtained before
the government announcement of the policy is not affected. Non-residential units are also
not subject to the Special Stamp Duty.
2.2 Seller’s Stamp duty tax - Singapore
Singapore first introduced the Seller’s Stamp Duty on 20th February 2010. Under the
Seller’s Stamp Duty, residential properties sold within one year is taxed at 1-3% of the
transaction prices, depending on the price bracket of the property. The exact tax rate
4This tax is levied on top of the underlying tax schedule.
5The duration of holding is defined as the time lapse between two legal documents that are
subject to stamp duty tax, which includes most provisional agreements signed
6Since this minimize the transaction price on paper and thus lower the amount of tax paid
out of the joint surplus.
7There are conditions in which the tax could be exempted: 1. the property is transferred to
close relatives; 2. re-selling by financial institutions under the condition of mortgage default 3.
transfer of property to government/charitable organizations 4. mandated selling by the court
5. selling of inherited properties 6. selling under bankruptcy 6. transfer of residential properties
between related corporate body http://www.ird.gov.hk/chi/faq/ssd.htm
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is a function of the transaction price - which creates a tax structure similar to the one
studied by Slemrod et al. (2016) in Washington D.C., where there is a simultaneous
decision problem in bunching at price versus bunching in time. Properties sold with
holding period beyond one year face 0% rate from the Seller’s Stamp Duty.
For properties obtained between 30th Aug 2010 to 13th Jan 2011, the taxable holding
duration were extended to 3 years. Moreover, notches were introduced in 1 and 2 year,
where the average tax rate drop by 1/3 at the 1 and 2 years cutoff. Therefore the size of
the tax notch varies with the price bracket, for example, for properties with price smaller
than 180,000SGD, selling within the first year implies 1% of tax rate, and the time notches
have reduction in average tax rate of 0.33% in both the 1 and 2 years cutoffs.
In 14 Jan 2011, the tax rate were raised to 16% for selling within the first year, 12% for
property sold in 1-2 year, 8% for property traded in 2-3 year, and 4% for property traded
between 3-4 year. This tax structure follow exactly the same as that in Hong Kong, with
a smaller drop in average tax rate at size of 4%. Also, the period that subject to the tax
is longer than that in Hong Kong.8 The tax schedule of the Seller’s Stamp Duty after 14
Jan 2011 is plotted in Figure 11.9.
3 Data
This paper uses government administrative transaction record of properties in Hong Kong,
covering 2009-2015. The data contains information of more than 3 million contracts that
is filed at the Land Registry for registration of tax purposes and is titled Memorial Day
Book. It contains sets of contracts signed and lodged to the Land Registry for formal
registration, including provisional/formal agreements of sales and purchases, assignment
of the properties and mortgage agreement. The agreement of sales and purchases for
residential property provide information on the date, address, value of the transaction as
well as stamp duty paid. For each property I observe the history of transaction from 2009,
I could therefore construct the duration of holding before its next sold, a key variable
for the analysis that follows. From 2009-2015 there are 480,351 residential transaction
records.10
The holding duration where the Special Stamp Duty applies counts from the first
agreement that is registered to the Land Registry, which could either be a formal or
provisional agreement of sales and purchases. While provisional agreements were signed
8Source: Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (2011)
9The transition of the seller’s stamp duty for properties worth less than 180,000 SGD is
summarized in Figure 11
10See data appendix for more detailed description.
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before the formal agreement as common practice, only those that had a significant lag
between the two would require registration of the provisional agreements. 11 In the em-
pirical analysis I correct for the date of purchases to the date of which the provisional
agreement is signed, if such provisional agreement exist in the Land Registry record.
For each residential transaction, I match it with the mortgage record filed to the Land
Registry, a common procedure for transaction where the property were purchased under
mortgage. This allows for construction of an indicator for whether the buyer purchase
the properties with cash or with mortgage.
I collect data on the rateable values, the government estimates of open market rents
adjusted according to property specific characteristics, for each properties being bought
and resold within the period 2009-2015, dated at October 2015. Rateable values are
used for tax purpose, as property owner are liable to pay the rate for each property
which is around 3-5 % of the rateable values, similar to the council tax in the UK. The
Rating and Valuation department states that the value adjust for property characteristics,
including age, size, location, floor, direction, transport facilities, amenities, quality of
finishes, building maintenance/repair and property management.12 This provides a single
measure of observables of property to control for property heterogeneity in the empirical
analysis. It is important to note that the assessment of the rateable value is not affected
by any sales restrictions or ownership status of the property.
I also obtained administrative record for Singapore residential properties transaction
record from the Real Estate Information System of the Urban Redevelopment Authority
of Singapore, from 1995 to 2015, which consists of 431,359 records during the period.
4 Empirical Setup and Measure
4.1 Extensive margin response
I first use regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of the Special Stamp Duty
on the probability that a property is being resold before 2 years where the transaction is
taxable and up to 3 years where the transaction is not taxed. This quantifies the extent
in which the Special Stamp Duty change the trading pattern.
Specifically, I exploit the fact that for properties purchased one day before the 20th
November 2010, there is no tax liability on all holding duration while those purchased right
11Usually the provisional agreement had to be registered if its lapse with the formal agreement
is mroe than 14 days
12It is published for the public every year from March to May upon search.
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on the 20th November it is liable for the tax. By comparing the behaviour of purchaser
before and after the application of the tax locally, who face almost identical demand con-
dition in the market following the purchases, one could identify the behavioural response
that comes from the side of seller. Moreover, with the assumption that purchaser who
signed the agreement one day before and after the application of the tax are similar in
their selling behaviour in the absence of tax conditional on observables, one could identify
the treatment effect of the tax schedule on the trading pattern.
In particular, the Special Stamp Duty introduced on 20th November 2010 had taxable
period of 2 years, and with distinct tax rate at transaction of holding period before and
after the cutoff of 6 months, 1 year and 2 years. I thus construct indicator Ty of whether
a property is traded within y years since last purchased, where y belongs to 6 months, 1
and 2 years.
To measure the extent of extensive margin response, one must take into account of the
re-timing in transaction due to tax avoidance incentives. If transaction could be perfectly
re-timed by incurring cost that is low relative to the surplus of the transaction, one would
observe that the probability of a property being resold not to be affected at horizon after
2 years. However, if re-timing is costly and the magnitude of tax is large relative to the
size of surplus, then the tax on holding duration could cause significant crowd out, which
could in turn have first order impact in welfare. I thus further construct the indicator Ty
for the 3 year horizon, allowing for one year of potential re-timing of transaction.
I estimate the following linear RDD regression for each property i and spell j around
20th November 2010,
Ty,ij = α + βt˜+ ρDt + β2Dt ∗ t˜+ ηij (1)
where t is measured in days. t˜ = t− tˆ where tˆ represent 20th November 2010, thus t˜
is the time difference in days from 20th November 2010. Dt is an indicator for t ≥ tˆ. Ty,ij
is an indicator if a property holding is resold within y years since its purchase.
The coefficient of interest is ρ, which capture the difference in probability of re-trade
in y years locally between purchaser who are subject to the tax and those who are not.
4.2 Tax incidence
The reduced form effect of tax burden on buyers and seller could be estimated with the
following equation
ln Pijt = β1 ∗Hij,6 ∗ postij + β2 ∗Hij,6−12 ∗ postij + β3 ∗Hij,12−24 ∗ postij
+ σs + γtln RVi + γt2ln RV
2
i + δt + it (2)
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where ln Pijt is pre-tax price for property i of spell j at time t.
13 Hijs is an indicator
for property i held for s months, postij is an indicator that equals 1 if Special Stamp Duty
is applicable to the property spell ij, i.e. bought between 20th Nov 2010-27th Oct 2012.
σs is month of holding FE at broad group category of 0-6 months, 6-12 months, 12-24
months and beyond 24 months. δt is fixed effect for the time in which the transactions
occur, this allows us to control for any changes in average buyer’s valuation affected by
the tax.
ln RVi is rateable value of property i measured at Oct 2015. As described in the data
section, this is the government estimated open market annual rental value in October
2015, which summarizes many property specific characteristics. This control for most
relevant heterogeneity of the property. As rent-price ratio can varies in the long run
(Gallin, 2008), I allow for arbitrary time variant fundamental relation between rental
rate and transaction price by allowing γt and γt2 to varies over time at month level. In
general, I could include an polynomial of ln RVi at higher order level, but as shown as
the robustness section, the inclusion of 3rd or higher order makes very little difference to
the empirical results.
4.3 Transaction Re-timing
To capture the overall effect and discontinuity in probability of trade generated by the
Special Stamp Duty, I estimate the following hazard function flexibly at week intervals:
Tijt =
J∑
j=0
wjIj + it (3)
where Tijt is an indicator of whether a trade happen for property i at time t at the jth
week since it was last purchased. Ij is a set of fully flexible dummy variables that capture
the baseline hazard.14 Equation 3 is estimated separately for residential properties in
Hong Kong purchased in 3 periods: 1) 1st January 2009 - 20th November 2010 where
there is no tax liability as function of holding duration; 2) between 20th November 2010-
26th October 2012 where time notches are present in the 6, 12, 24 months and 3) on or
after 27th October 2012 where time notches are present in 6, 12, 24, 36 months. As far
as the data allows, I estimate equation 3 taking J up to 158 weeks. That allows one to
capture any re-timing effect up to the third year.
The degree of re-timing would be captured by the estimate wj where j equals the time
of the notch. One would expect the probability of trade to be much higher right on the
notch, and if there is any market friction that prevent trading happening exactly at time
13A spell is defined as a holding that start since a transaction occurred
14Estimating Equation 3 by OLS is equivalent to the Kaplan-Meier estimator
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t¯, one would also see that for the immediate weeks after the notch the estimate wj would
still be higher than the counter-factual wj as estimated using properties without the tax
liability. Correspondingly, one would observe wj would be lower than counter factual for
weeks immediately before the time notch.
Similarly for Singapore I estimate the hazard function of trade up to 5 years as the
data allows, to capture any re-timing effect following the time notch at the 4 years since
purchase.
4.4 Type selection
To identify the selection effect of the Special Stamp Duty on new buyers, I estimate the
proportion of transaction where mortgages are filed in each week before and after the
introduction of the tax. I estimate the following event-study equation using transactions
of residential properties that has price below HKD 6,800,000, a price range with minimal
change in loan-to-value ratio limit in the mortgage market for period 3 months before
and after 20 November 201015
mit = β + β1 ∗
24∑
b=−24
wbIb + µi + γdm + it (4)
mit ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator equal to 1 if the property i at time t is purchased by
mortgage buyer. Ib is an indicator of whether the transaction it occurred bth weeks
before or after the application of Special Stamp Duty phase 1. To increase the power and
control for seasonality, I estimate the following regression:
mit = β + β2 ∗ Afterit + µi + γdm + it
further including district-month of the year fixed effect γdm by extending the sample
from July 2009 to March 2011, and property fixed effect µi to control for unobserved
characteristics of the property.
15If any of the exogenous reduction in loan-to-value ratio limit in this period have effect on
mortgage demand, the estimate in this section provide a lower bound of the selection effect. See
Figure A.4 for a graphical summary of change in loan-to-limit ratio since 2009 in various price
range.
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5 Results
5.1 Re-timing and extensive margin response
Figure 2 plots the RDD graphs on the probability of re-sale in different time horizon
since purchase by the day of the property was being obtained. The outcome variables are
accumulative in each of the panels in Figure 2, thus the probability of being resold in 3
years in panel (a) is by definition larger than the probability of being resold in 6 months
in panel (d). It is clear from all the panels in Figure 2 that there is a sharp discontinuity
on 20th November 2010. For purchasers who purchase one day after 20th November 2010,
the probability of resold in 6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years are all significantly lower
than those before it.
Table 1 reports the RD estimate of equation 1. Column (1) shows the coefficient for
the effect of the tax on probability of re-sold in 3 years, where the estimate for ρ is -0.133
and is highly statistically significant, suggesting that purchaser who are subject to the
tax are less likely to trade in 3 years by 13 percentage point. The baseline probability of
a property being resold in 3 years is 29 percentage point, in which the treatment effect
suggest a very large drop in the transaction at extensive margin. On the other hand, the
estimates for ρ in column (4) for probability of resold in 6 months is exceptionally large
at -0.0743 in relation to its baseline mean which is 7.59 percentage point, suggesting that
the Special Stamp Duty reduced trade at very short duration dramatically.
I further estimate equation 1 by the type of buyers with or without mortgage. The
treatment effect for buyers on the chance of resold in 3 years, for those without any
mortgage is 16.6 percentage point, and is bigger than those without mortgage, where
the treatment effect is 11.6 percentage point. This provide evidence that the tax has a
stronger extensive margin effect on purchaser who are more likely to re-trade in early
period.
Table 3 report estimate of equation 1 for the holding duration conditional on a prop-
erty holding is resold before 31st December 2015. Column (1) report the estimate for all
property holdings, while the average holding duration conditional on sales is 733 days
before the treatment, the Special Stamp Duty increase the holding duration conditional
on sales by 334 days. Comparing column (2) and (3), the magnitude of the treatment
effect is of the same order of magnitude for property holding that is associated with or
without mortgages.
Table 4 reports estimate of equation 1 on the probability of a property being resold in
5 years for the effect of Seller’s Stamp Duty Phase 3 on 14 Jan 2011, where the maximum
taxable holding period is up to 4 years and therefore capture the extensive margin effect
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taking potential re-timing of transaction into account. The coefficient estimate is -0.058,
which suggest that property were less likely to be re-traded in 5 years by 5.8 percentage
point. The related RDD graph is plotted in Figure A.7.
I also conduct the test on continuity of the density around the cutoff date as suggested
by McCrary (2008). Panel (a) and (b) of Figure A.8 plot the density of trading day around
20th Nov 2010 for Hong Kong, and the graphs suggest that there is discontinuity in the
density of trade around this period of time. The density mass of the transaction on the
day the policy announced on 19 Nov 2010, which is a Friday, is not significantly higher
than previous Friday, implying there is very little manipulation in the conventional sense.
It suggest that the discontinuity is mainly driven by reduction in transaction after the
application of the policy, which is by itself an outcome of the tax policy. The graphical
evidences from Figure 2 display no discontinuous change in the outcomes to the left
of the cutoff, again confirming that the RD estimate is unlikely to be confounded by
manipulation.
5.2 Tax incidence
Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates for equation 2 for transaction price of residential
properties sold in 2009-2015 in Hong Kong. Column (1) leaves out (log) rateable values
as control while column (2) includes it. The coefficients of interest are post*sold 6m,
post*sold 6-12m and post *sold 1-2year. The estimate for post*sold 6m is -0.0103 %,
implying that property traded with 5% tax are associated with 1.03 % lower price for
seller, and the buyer pay 3.97% higher price for the property that are observationally
equivalent to property that are not subject to the tax in the same market. The coefficient
post*sold 6-12m is -0.0505 and statistically significant, suggesting that property that are
subject to 10% special stamp duty were traded at price 5.05 % lower, and thus buyers are
paying 4.95 % higher price for the property. For property that are sold within the first
6 months are sold on average 8.85 % lower seller price, where it is subject to tax rate of
15%. This suggest that buyer pays around 6.15% higher price.
The difference between the estimates for post*sold 6m,post*sold 6-12m is around 0.038
and the difference between post*sold 6-12m and post*sold 1-2year is around 0.04. For
every additional increase in the tax rate from 5% to 10% and 10% to 15%, the buyer only
bear around 1 % of the additional tax, while the seller receive price that is 4% lower.
Comparing column (1) and (2), there are significant selection in the value of prop-
erties being traded under high transaction tax. In column (1) where I did not include
rateable value as control, the post*sold 6m coefficient is positive, in line with the pattern
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observed in Figure 15, in which the median transaction price is plotted against the hold-
ing duration. The coefficient become significantly negative once we control for rateable
values, suggesting that selection on observables explains a large proportion of the posi-
tive coefficient in column (1). Similarly, the coefficient post*sold 6-12m is not statistically
significant and is close to zero in column (1), while it turns into negative and significant
once I control for rateable value. This suggest that properties at a higher price range have
a larger mass for having surplus beyond 10%.
Figure A.10 plot the relationship between the log price and log rateable values for the
sample in 2009. It shows the log rateable value is highly correlated with transaction price
in a stable manner. In Table 6 I examined whether second order polynomial is a good fit
for Rateable value as control for observables in the transaction price. I estimate equation
2 using 1-4 order polynomials from column (2)-(5). Upon the 2nd order polynomial, the
estimates are very robust to adding additional polynomial terms. This suggest that 2nd
order polynomial is a very good fit for rateable value to predict transaction price.
5.3 Transaction re-timing
Figure 5 plots the coefficients of wj in equation 3 for properties that are purchased
between January 2009 to 19th November 2010 and from 20th November 2010 to 26th
October 2012. There is significant re-timing for transaction, and sharp discontinuities are
observed in each of the time notch. There are three salient patterns 1) the tax schedule
unambiguously decrease the probability of trade within the first 2 years of purchases; 2)
the probability of trade increase dramatically at exactly 2 year, the last tax notch where
the tax rate drop to 0; 3) the excess probability of trade is decreasing gradually after the
2 year time notch. Pattern (2) and (3) together provide sound evidence that many trades
in the market are intentionally shifting their trading time to avoid the 5% tax rate within
the 1-2 year window of holding period.
The reduction in the probability of trade within the first 2 years is proportional
to the magnitude of the tax. Within the first year, the decline in the probability of
trade is around 0.2-0.4%, which is almost equal to the pre-treatment average. In the 1-2
year period, the treatment effect is around 0.15%, and the probability of trade after the
application of Special Stamp Duty is decreasing as one approach the 2 year time notch.
Figure 8 plot both the hazard function of trade and the coefficients of weekj in equa-
tion 3 by whether the transaction has a affiliated mortgages. Panel (a) plotted the hazard
function by type of buyers for properties obtained under period that is unaffected by the
tax, which shows cash buyer are more likely to trade within the first year, while starting
from the second year the difference diminished or even reversed. The treatment effect
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of tax plotted from panel (b) shows that the Special Stamp Duty has a much stronger
impact on cash buyer than buyer who filed mortgages, mainly due to the fact that cash
buyer has a larger baseline probability of trading below 1 year. The probability of trade
in the 1-2 years period on both type of buyers from 1-2 year period are indistinguishable
after the application of the tax. And both exhibit similar degree of bunching towards the
2nd year time notch.
5.4 Selection of buyer
Figure 9 plot the estimates of coefficients of time t in equation 4. The base group is on the
third week of November 2010. The coefficients are not statistically significant from zero
before the introduction of Special Stamp Duty, and also exhibit no trends. The estimates
of the time coefficients after third week of November 2012 are slightly positive and become
statistically significant at around 0.05 percentage point after the 5th weeks.
Table 7 shows the estimation results of equation 4. Column (1) report the coefficient
that cover sample of 2 months before and after the introduction of Special Stamp Duty.
The estimates suggest that after the introduction of the special stamp duty tax, 1.7% of
the buyer are buyers who would filed mortgage, compare to period in which the Special
Stamp Duty was not in place. Column (2) and (3) extends the sample to 3 and 4 months
before and after the Special Stamp Duty and the coefficient is largely similar in magnitude.
Column (4) extends the sample to July 2009 to March 2011, and control for district-
month of the year fixed effect to control for seasonality in the last quarter of the year.
The estimate become 2.92%, which is very close to estimates in column (1)-(3). Column
(5) control for property fixed effects, and the coefficient become even bigger at magnitude
of 5.52%. The evidence suggest that after the introduction of the Special Stamp Duty
among the new buyer there is 2-5% more of those filed mortgages.
6 Conceptual framework
In this section I provide an empirically relevant framework to understand the welfare
implication of transaction tax on holding duration. The market response and welfare cost
of transaction tax with time notches largely depends on the time preferences of represen-
tative buyers and sellers. (Slemrod et al., 2016) If buyer and seller has low adjustment
cost in transaction time, a time notch may generate significant bunching toward the side
with lower average tax rate to avoid tax. (e.g. the right hand side of the time notch in
Figure 1) This means the tax would shift the timing of transaction, but few matched
transactions would be forgone. On the other hand if adjustment cost is high, there would
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be limited tax avoidance behaviour, but transaction with low surplus would be crowded
out from the market depending on the size of the tax rate.
Central to this, I present a stylized model on buyer and sellers simultaneous deci-
sion on transaction price and trading time, simplifed from Slemrod et al. (2016). In the
empirical section I would show that its prediction match the basic pattern of the mar-
ket reaction, and argue that it provides a framework for identifying the adjustment cost
in time for transaction. In the model, buyers and sellers explicitly prefer early trading
date.16 The trade-off in the optimal trading time at the intensive margin naturally fea-
tures intertemporal decision between tax saving and disutility associated with delaying
transaction.
Consider a pair of matched buyer and seller who value the property by H and u
respectively, at time t counting from the seller last bought the house. The buyer and
seller bargain over the price and trading time through Nash bargaining. A tax notch is
set by the government, where the transaction is taxable at rate τ¯ if the trade is executed
at time T when T < t¯, otherwise tax rate
¯
τ applies where
¯
τ < τ¯ .
The seller’s surplus in a transaction is
Sv = p− u− kv(T − t)
where seller receive price p over losing the reservation value u. kv(T − t) capture the
time preference of the seller, and T − t is the time between the transaction and the match
was first formed. Assume that kv > 0 so that the seller prefer trading earlier. kv is thus
the utility cost in delaying transaction per unit of time. kv(T − t) could be considered as
first order local approximation for a general function of T and t.
Similarly, the buyer’s surplus is
Sb = H − p(1 + τ)− kb(T − t)
where the buyer get the valuation H, pay the price p, and are subject to tax rate τ ,
where τ ∈ {¯τ, τ¯}. kb(T − t) capture the time preference of buyer, with kb > 0 so that the
buyer also prefer to trade sooner than later.
The trading time T and price p is determined by Nash Bargaining that maximize the
joint surplus, i.e.
maxT,p (Sb)
1−θ(Sv)θ
16Where in Slemrod et al. (2016) it is modelled as buyer and seller having an ideal trade-date,
a setup that is more relevant when considering an increase in tax rate after a fixed date
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If trade happen at time T, transaction price would follow the first order condition
(1 + τ)(1− θ)Sv = θSb, explicitly given by the following
p(T, t,H, u) =
 θ1+τ¯H + (1− θ)u if T = tθ
1+
¯
τ
[H − kb(t¯− t)] + (1− θ)(u+ kv(t¯− t))] if T = t¯
(5)
To maximize the joint-surplus, only T = t¯ and T = t would be chosen, therefore a
match between of buyer and seller, depending on the respective size of H and u, would
decide upon: 1) trade immediately at time T = t, 2) bunch at the time notch T = t¯, or
3) no trade at all.
To understand better the trade-off, a pair of buyer and seller would choose to trade
exactly at the time t¯ if
Sb(T = t¯) + Sv(T = t¯) > max{Sb(T = t) + Sv(T = t), 0}
When
¯
τ = 0, the condition in which the match would wait until t¯ to trade could be
further reduced into
p(t, t,H, u)∆τt > (kb + kv)(t¯− t) (6)
where ∆τ = τ¯ −
¯
τ . The left hand side of equation 6 is the tax saving of executing the
transaction at time t¯ instead of time t, while the right hand side of the equation is the
total utility cost of delaying the transaction by t¯− t unit of time. 17
Proposition 1 Assume that H and u follows some joint distribution of G(H, u), if time
preference for trade is weak, i.e. kb + kv is small, then more transactions would trade
exactly at t¯, less transactions are carried out at t < t¯
Proposition 1 says that when time preference is weak, the buyer and seller has little
to lost by delaying the trade date. This also implies that we may observe very few trans-
actions realizing before t¯. One thing to note is that the shifting in timing of transaction
need not depends only on the time preference of the seller even if the tax is seller specific.
In an economy where the seller has distinct characteristics than the buyer, in terms of
demographics or economic wealth18, both the time preference for buyer and sellers affect
how the market response to the tax.
17The general case where
¯
τ 6= 0 is p(t, t,H, u)∆τt > (kb + kv)(t¯− t)−∆pt
¯
τ
18e.g. Lawrance (1991) finds that poorer households has higher rate of time preference
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Proposition 2 At the notch of which
¯
τ = 0, and some joint distribution of H and u
G(H, u)
1. the probability of trading at time t decrease as t get closer to t¯, for t < t¯
2. The observed reduction in probability of trade at t < t¯, where the tax rate drop to 0
after t¯, is larger than the case with a tax policy that applies tax rate τ for all trading
time t
When
¯
τ = 0, the decision between trading immediately or delaying transactions de-
pends on the relative rate of decline between the saving of tax with the utility lost of
delaying. In general, the disutility decline with the rate kb + kv when one get closer to t¯,
while the savings by tax decrease by the rate ((1 − θ)kv − θkb)∆τt < kb + kv. Thus the
probability of trade at time t for t < t¯ is decreasing in t.
The condition in which the three decisions are determined are illustrated in Figure
A.12. It plots the combination of different H and u with the relevant constraints when
¯
τ = 0. In the absence of tax, trade would happen for H and u when surplus is strictly
positive.
When a transaction tax τ is introduced, only matches with surplus higher than τ
percent of the reservation value of seller are traded. However if a time notch in t¯ is
present, some matches that would yield non-positive surplus under tax τ would then
have positive surplus by waiting until t¯ to trade (i.e. area B in Figure A.12).
The empirical prediction in Proposition 2 can seen by conducting comparative static
with respect to t. For matches formed far away from t¯ implies a higher (kb + kv)(t¯ − t).
The line H − u ≥ k(t) and the downward sloping dotted line would both move to the
right. The area B+W would unambiguously decrease, and the area T+A would increase.
When matches are formed far away from the time notch t¯, the probability of trading at
time t thus increase.
Consider a exogenous increase in τ . Less transactions has the surplus over reservation
value ratio higher than the tax rate, but at the same time it lower the cutoff of pd in
which it worth trading exactly at t¯.
6.1 Selection on buyers and effect on equilibrium price
The application of transaction tax with rates that decrease with holding duration could
create selection on type of buyers and changes the outside option of buyer in the search
process.
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If buyers have predetermined characteristics θ that could predict average trading time
of the property in the future, buyers with different θ would foresee to face a different tax
rate in expectation. In particular, the valuation of a buyer at the time of buyer could be
represented as
H = φ(θ)
¯
u(τ) + (1− φ(θ))u¯− z(τ) (7)
where
¯
u(τ) is the present discounted value of selling in period t < t¯, u¯ is the present
discounted value of selling in period t > t¯, as long as
¯
u < u¯, there would be more buyer
in the market with characteristics θh > θl with φ
′(θ) > 0
Furthermore, by reducing the probability of buyer matched with seller with positive
surplus, the tax can affect the outside option of the buyer in the bargaining process.
For example, the outside option z(τ) could be decreasing in τ if the tax reduce the
effective supply. On the other hand if the selection effect reduce the number of buyers
in the market, it may increase the chance the buyer meeting another seller with positive
surplus, in that case z(τ) would be increasing in τ . Formally endogenizing the outside
option for buyer is beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Estimating waiting time and welfare cost of de-
layed transactions
To quantify the effect of the tax notch on trading time, I estimate the average waiting
time for traders in the market t¯− t(H, u), where t(H, u) is defined by rewriting equation
8 in the following form for each pair of H and u:
p(H, u)∆τt = (kb + kv)(t¯− t(H, u))) (8)
t(H, u) could be interpreted as the cutoff trading time for a transaction with price
p(H, u). If the seller meet a buyer at time t where t ∈ {t(H, u), t¯}, the optimal trading
time would be at time t¯. For a given tax notch τ , expectation of the cutoff trading time
and t¯ across all the potentially profitable trades, E(t¯ − t(H, u)|H − u > τu), would be
the average waiting time for which the market would be willing to delay the transactions
to time t¯.
Assume that the density of arrival time of matches is l(t), and the density of trading
time in the presence of tax τ is g(t), which could be estimated from the data, the excess
mass B at t¯ could be represented as
B ≈
∫
H−u>τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
l(t)dtdG(H, u) = g(t¯)(E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) (9)
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where G(H, u) is any joint distribution function of H and u. 19
The approximation is more accurate if the extensive margin response near the time
notch is negligible. Under existence of extensive margin response locally at the time notch,
the bunching estimates could provide a upper/lower bound of the quantity of interest,
(E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu), by scaling the excess bunching mass with the density of the
counter-factual density with tax rate 0 or with tax rate τ , which I provide more discussion
on it in the appendix. 20 Following the existing literature as in Best and Kleven (2015)
and Chetty et al. (2011), I estimate the counter-factual density g(t) using the following
equation:
bj = c(j) +
k=t¯+R∑
k=t¯−R
δkI[j = k] + µj (10)
where bj is the bin count in holding duration for jth weeks, c(j) is a 7th order poly-
nomial in terms of number of weeks, and I[j = k] is a set of dummies for R week before
and after the tax notch at t¯. 21 The prediction of this equation, c(t¯), is going to pro-
vide an estimate of the counterfactual density g(t¯), conceptually by excluding the weeks
immediately before/after t¯. Thus we could compute the estimate using equation 9.
Eˆ(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) ≈ Bˆ
ˆg(t)
where Bˆ is computed using the observed excess bin count around t¯.
The ratio of waiting time to tax bear an intuitive interpretation for estimating the
utility cost of kb + ks as percentage of trading price, by taking appropriate expectation
over equation 8 and rearranging terms:
∆τ
E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) =
kb + ks
E(p|H − u > τu) (11)
7.1 Results
Figure 13 panel (a) plots the actual and estimated counter-factual density of the 2 years
notch of the Special Stamp Duty, for properties purchased between 20 November 2010
to 26 October 2012. Using the gap between the actual density and the counter-factual to
19The estimate would be robust to the case where buyer and seller have exponential discount-
ing with first order linearization, in that case kb = Hρb and kv = uρv, where ρb and ρv are
discount rates of the buyer and seller respectively
20In the case of there is significant extensive margin response in at time t¯, the estimate provide
a bounding on (E(t¯− t(H,u)|H−u > τu). A detailed discussion is presented in the section A.3.
21In practice I include the dummy variables for holding duration from 330 to 400 days to
estimate the excess mass at 1 year notch, and 694 to 864 days for the 2 years notch.
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calculate the excess mass, I find that on average the cutoff waiting time, E(t¯−t(H, u)|H−
u > τu), is 17.39 week when the size of the notch is 5%.
Panel (b) plot the actual and estimated counter-factual density of the 4 years notch
of the Seller’s Stamp Duty, for properties purchased between 14 January 2011, in which
the 3rd phase of the Seller’s Stamp Duty begins, to those that are purchased before 14
January 2012. I restrict plotting the data to the one year windows because for those
properties that are purchased in mid-2012 the transaction after 4 years since purchased
is still not being observed at the time of writing. I find that the bunching estimates of
the average cutoff waiting time is 13.32 week, slightly smaller than the estimate from the
Special Stamp Duty but is associated with a smaller tax notch at 4%.
Using equation 11, one can apply the estimates obtained for E(t¯−t(H, u)|H−u > τu)
and the related size of tax notch to identify kb+kv
E(p)
which is the proportional welfare cost of
delaying a transaction by a week. From the 2 years tax notch of the Special Stamp Duty
phase 1, the implied kb+kv
E(p|H−u>τu) is 0.29%, while from the last tax notch of the 3rd phase
of Seller’s Stamp Duty, the implied estimate for kb+kv
E(p|H−u>τu) equals 0.3%, suggesting delay
in a single transaction would results in lost of trading surplus by 0.3% of the value of the
transacted property.
8 Welfare analysis
Following the conceptual framework, the welfare gain from transaction in the economy
per unit of property held less than 3 years when the tax rate is 0 is given by
W (0) =
∫
t
∫
H−u>0
(H − u)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) (12)
With tax rate τ > 0, the welfare is given by
W (τ) =
∫
t
∫
A,T
(H−u)dG(H, u)dL˜(t)+
∫
t
∫
W,B
(H−u)−(kb+kv)(t¯−t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t)+λR(τ)
(13)
where A, T denote the value of H, u such that trading immediately is optimal, W,B
denote the value of H, u where wait is the optimal decision, as shown in Figure A.12.
Denoting the tax revenue by R(τ) and the shadow value of tax revenue as λ, the change
in welfare is given by
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W (τ)−W (0) + λR(τ) =
−
∫
t
∫
NT
H − udG(H, u)dL˜(t)−
∫
t
∫
W,B
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) + (λ− 1)R(τ)
(14)
To bound the welfare loss, I use the estimates of kb + kv from the previous section.
The welfare cost associated with the second term, for which a property were forced to
wait until 2 years, could be approximated by
∫
t
∫
W,B
(kb+kv)(t¯−t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) ≈ (kb+kv)∗E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu)
2
2
∗P (H−u > τu)∗l(t¯)
We could obtain an estimate of P (H − u > τu) ∗ l(t¯) by the probability of a property
trade per week after for t < t¯, which is roughly 0.0005 under the 5% tax. Assuming the
the tax rate was 5% everywhere with t¯ equals to 2 years, the welfare cost associated with
the second term is 17.36
2
2
∗ 0.29% ∗ 0.0005 ∗ E(p) = 0.02% ∗ E(p) of the average value of
property in the market.
To quantify the welfare loss at the extensive margin, it would be important to under-
stand how trading surplus is distributed among transactions that were crowded out. For
example, at a tax rate of 5%, all the transaction that were crowded out must have surplus
lower than 5% of the seller’s reservation value. Whether the trading surplus concentrated
mostly towards 0% versus 5% determine the size of the lost in trading surplus.
To understand better the distribution of trading surplus, I take advantage of the fact
that under the same context both the Special Stamp Duty and the Seller’s Stamp Duty
generate exogenous variation in tax rate that results in different trading hazard at various
tax level. The hazard rate of trade at a particular tax level depends on likelihood that
trading surplus in proportional sense, z ≡ H−u
u
, is greater than the transaction tax level.
In particular, at different tax rate τ and τ ′ abstracting from the re-timing close to the
notch, with h(τ) being the hazard rate of trade at time t with tax rate τ , we can calculate
the density of the trading surplus
lim
τ ′→τ
h(τ)− h(τ ′)
h(0)− h(τ¯)
1
(τ − τ ′) == −j(τ |0 < z < τ¯) (15)
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for any τ and τ ′ that is close, τ < τ ′, and τ¯ > {τ, τ ′}. 22
That is, by comparing the rate in which the hazard rate decline with respect to tax
rate, one could infer the density of the conditional distribution of the surplus. Moreover,
with enough data point at each tax rate, one could estimate non-parametrically the
density of the trading surplus.
For the Special stamp Duty, I get estimates from the earlier section on h(τ) where
τ ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15}
In practice, I use the hazard rate h(τ) where τ = {0, 5} to estimate the conditional
density at τ = 0, and use τ = {5, 10} to estimate the conditional density at τ = 5 so and
so forth.
The results for both trading surplus in Hong Kong and Singapore is presented in
graph A.11, and the shape is very similar using the two procedures. It suggest that the
trading surplus decline very rapidly at around 4-10%, and there is little mass above the
threshold of 10%.
Using a linear approximation of the density between 0% and 5%, I find that the
conditional expectation of the trading surplus is E(H−u
u
|0 < H−u
u
< 0.05) = 2.23%.
Therefore the extensive margin lost would be −0.13 ∗ 2.23% = −0.29% of the value of
property.
In total, the lower bound of welfare loss would be the sum of the intensive and extensive
margin, which amounts to 0.31% of the value of a representative property. This is the
welfare loss per each new holding, and is increasing in the number of properties purchased
in which the policy is in place. Given that very little tax revenue is generated from the
tax schedule, this suggest non-trivial welfare loss to the property market as a whole.
9 Discussion
9.1 Comparison with capital gain tax
The extensive margin response or lock-in effect shown previously, in comparison to pre-
vious literature, is reasonably large. For example, Shan (2011) finds that 10,000 USD
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lim
τ ′→τ
h(τ)− h(τ ′)
h(0)− h(τ¯)
1
(τ − τ ′) = limτ ′→τ
(P (z > τ)− P (z > τ ′))l(t)
(P (z > 0)− P (z > τ¯)(τ − τ ′)l(t)
= −j(τ |0 < z < τ¯)
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increase in capital gains tax liability reduces semiannual sales by 0.1 percentage points.
Take the upper bound on the special stamp duty tax and assume the tax rate of 15%
apply to all the transaction below 2 years, for a residential property at median price ap-
proximately 4,000,000 HKD, this only translates into 0.77 percentage point reduction in
sales rate every half year, which in turns translate into 4.5 percentage point reduction in
probability of sales in three years. This is only one-third of the extensive margin response
from the RDD estimate. 23 It suggests that transaction tax have larger impact of on the
extensive margin of transaction than capital gain tax in terms because the tax applies
regardless of the magnitude of appreciation of the asset.
9.2 Simulation of short-holding trades and equilibrium price
effect
To evaluate the effect on equilibrium price from reduction in effective supply of short-
holdings properties, I proxy for the short-run supply by
SSdt =
150∑
j=1
wˆjtNd,t−j
where Nd,t−j is the number of transaction in district d in week t − j.24 The effec-
tive supply is proxied by probability of the properties being sold in the market, wj,t−j,
multiplied by the number of properties purchased in period t− j in district d.
wj,t−j is time-varying. For the three period with different tax liability, from Jan 2009
to 19 November 2010, 20 November 2010 to 27 October 2012, 27 October 2012 to 31
December 2015, it equals to the estimated coefficient wj in equation 3 estimated for
properties purchased in the relevant period. The evolution of the variable SSdt is plotted
in Figure 10. During the period, predicted short-run re-sales drop continuously from
December 2011 to December 2015. The continuous decline in predicted re-sales in 2012
coincides with rise in transaction price even within each districts, and the increase in
transaction price come to a slow down in the last quarter of 2012 together with the
increase in the predicted re-sales.
10 Conclusion
In this paper I show that tax notches at holding duration in Hong Kong and Singapore
generate distinct incentives for buyer and seller in re-timing the transaction, on average
231− (1−0.0077)6 = 0.045, where (1−0.0077)6 is the probability of a property remain unsold
in 3 years.
24Number of district is 3, the largest natural division for Hong Kong
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for 3-4 weeks for each 1% of tax savings. Combined with the actual significant size of the
tax, it reduced the probability of a property being traded by 13 percentage point even
one year after the tax dropped to zero, which could be due to the search frictions in the
property market. Buyer share up to 41-80% of the burden of the transaction tax, which
may have high social cost in a policy that gives larger welfare weight to buyer than seller.
This paper also provides evidence that the selection effect of the such a tax instrument
is weak. Tax on holding duration were used as public policy tool to deter speculation in
the 1970s in North America, but very little were known about the tool before the new
wave of introduction of similar tax instrument in east Asia in 2010s. This paper suggest
that the aggregate welfare loss could be large for an understudied tax instrument that
survived through history.
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11 Figures
Figure 1: Tax on holding duration: Hong Kong
Notes: The graph plots the transaction tax rate as function of holding duration of properties
since last purchased (the Special Stamp Duty), which applies to residential properties obtained
after 20 November 2010 in Hong Kong (the solid line), and for those obtained after October
2012 (the dotted line). It is levied on top of the basic stamp duty rate that does not depend on
the holding duration of a property.
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Figure 2: RDD plot: all purchases
(a) Probability of resold in 3 years (b) Probability of resold in 2 years
(c) Probability of resold in 1 year (d) Probability of resold in 6 months
Note: The graphs plot the probability of a property being resold in 3,2,1 and 0.5 years since last purchased by the day in which they are obtained. The
vertical line shows the day of 20 November 2010, in which the Special Stamp Duty first applies. The dotted lines are fitted linear trend in the probability
of resold in the respective horizon, estimated separately for period before and after 20 November 2010.
28
Figure 3: RD: Conditional average holding duration
Note: The graph plots the holding duration for residential properties in Hong Kong purchased
in the window of 20 Aug 2010 to 20 Feb 2011, conditional on the properties being resold before
Dec 2015. The dotted lines are fitted linear trend in the conditional holding duration in the
respective horizon, estimated separately for period before and after 20 November 2010.
Figure 4: Duration of residential property holdings: 2009-2015
(a) Purchased before and under SSD phase 1
Notes: The graphs plot the distribution of holding duration for properties obtained in 2009 in
Hong Kong, between 1 to 158 weeks. Each dot represent the frequency count of a bin width of
7 days period. The blue/circle dots plot the density of the holding duration for those obtained
between January 2009 and 20 November 2010, where no tax rate is applied as function of holding
duration. The red/triangle dots plot in addition the density of the holding duration for those
obtained between 20 November 2010 to November 2012, where the 1st phase of special stamp
duty applies. Sample includes all residential properties transactions as described in the data
appendix.
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Figure 5: Hazard function of trade: holding duration by week
Notes: The graph plots the hazard function estimated using OLS of weekly dummies for the
holding period, where the outcome variable is an indicator of a trade happening in week t,
with a panel of trading record at each week since a property is obtained using the transaction
history for properties. The blue dots plot the hazard rate at each week for properties purchased
from January 2009 to 19 November 2010, and the red dots plot the hazard rate for properties
purchased from 20 November 2010 to 26 October 2012. Trading date is adjusted to the date
of the provisional contract first signed when applicable. The hazard functions are estimated
separately for properties obtained in each period.
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Figure 6: Hazard of trade: Special stamp duty phase 1 and phase 2, Hong Kong
Notes: See note of Figure 5. The graph plots the hazard rate for properties purchased between
20 Nov 2010 to 27 Oct 2012 and from 28 Oct 2012 to 31 Dec 2015.
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Figure 7: Pre-tax price regression: coefficient plots
(a) Broad category
(b) Monthly non-parametric
Notes: Panel (a) - The graph plot the post ∗H coefficients of the price regression in column 2 of
Table 5; the coefficient of post ∗Hi,j indicate that the property is sold within the i and j month
of holding the property; Outcome variable is log of pre-tax price; Controls includes holding
duration FE in broad group, date of sales FE (Year-month), 2nd order polynomial of log of
rateable values and its interaction with year-month dummies; Panel (b) - The graph plots the
post∗ ithmonths of holding duration coefficients of the price regression in column 2 of Table 5 in
the flexible specification; the coefficient of post ∗ ithmonth indicate that the property is sold on
the ith month of holding the property; Outcome variable is log of pre-tax price; Controls includes
holding duration FE in broad group, date of sales FE (Year-month), 2nd order polynomial of
log of rateable values and its interaction with year-month dummies.
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Figure 8: Hazard function of trade: by mortgage buyer and cash buyer
(a) Hazard of trade: pre
(b) Hazard of trade: post
Notes: See note of Figure 5. Panel (a) present the estimate for the hazard function for transaction
spell that has an associated mortgage record and those that do not have an associated mortgage
record. Panel (b) present the estimate for the hazard function for properties purchased under
Special Stamp Duty phase 1, between 20 November 2010 to 26 October 2012.
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Figure 9: Effect of SSD on selection of type of buyers: event study
Notes: The graph presents estimates for equation 4. Sample include transaction in 20 Aug 2010
to Jan 20 March 2011 for properties purchased with price below HKD 6800000. Control includes
districts fixed effects.
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Figure 10: Predicted number of short-run resales
(a) All
(b) Midterm
(c) Longterm
Notes: The graph plots the predicted number of sales from properties purchased in the past 3
years, using the number of transaction in jth week before time t, weighted by the estimates of
hazard function wj , according to the tax liability of t− j. It cover data from the December 2011
to Dec 2015. The dash-line plot the median (log) transaction price in the district in week t.
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Figure 11: Tax on holding duration: Singapore
Notes: The graph plots the tax rate for residential properties under the Seller’s Stamp Duty as
function of holding period, for properties purchased in different period in Singapore from Phase
1 to Phase 3. In Phase 1 and 2 the Seller’s Stamp Duty to be paid follows the rate at which
the marginal rate is {1, 2, 3}% in the three brackets of {≤ 180000, 180000− 360000,≥ 360000}
SGD in the 1st year; for Phase 2 it follows the same tax structure of rate {23 , 43 , 2}% in the 2nd
year and {13 , 23 , 1}% in the 3rd year.
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Figure 12: Holding duration: Singapore
(a) Purchased from 2006 to 20 Feb 2010 (b) Purchased between 20 Feb 2010, 29 Aug 2010
(c) Purchased between 29 Aug 2010, 13 Jan 2011 (d) Purchased on or after 14 Jan 2011-31 Sep 2016
Notes: The graph shows the holding duration distribution of residential units in Singapore from same day to 5 years. Each point shows the frequency
of holding at 7 days bin.
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Figure 13: Estimation of average cutoff of waiting time
(a) Hong Kong SSD phase 1: 2 years notch
(b) Singapore SGSSD phsae 3: 4 years notch
Notes: Panel (a) - The graph plot the frequency of holding period at the bin of week same as
Figure 5, for residential properties purchased between 20 Nov 2010 to 27 Oct 2012 in Hong
Kong, and from 52th to 158th week. The data excluded are from 92th week to 124th week. The
excess mass are defined as mass above the counterfactual density from 104 to 124th week. Panel
(b) - The graph plot the frequency of holding period at the bin of week same for residential
properties purchased between 14 Jan 2011 to 14 Jan 2012 in Singapore. Excess mass defined
from 208th week to 213th week.
12 Tables
Table 1: RDD: HK SSD Phase 1
Outcome: Probability of resold in
3 years 2 years 1 year 6 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RD estimate=1 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.0743∗∗∗
(0.00934) (0.00947) (0.00477) (0.00358)
Observations 52137 52137 52137 52137
Baseline mean 0.290 0.225 0.135 0.0759
Notes: Sample includes residential properties purchased from 20 Aug 2010-20 Feb 2011 in Hong
Kong. Cut off is defined for purchases before or after 20 November 2010, the specification al-
low differential linear trend function for properties purchased before and after 20 November
2010. Column (1) includes all transactions; Column (2) includes transactions that has no mort-
gage record associated; Column (3) includes transactions that has mortgage record associated.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of day of purchase.
Table 2: RDD: HK SSD Phase 1, by type of purchases
Outcome: Resold in 3 years
All No mortgage Mortgage
(1) (2) (3)
RD estimate=1 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.00934) (0.0160) (0.00968)
Observations 52137 16687 35450
Notes: Sample includes residential properties purchased from 20 Aug 2010-20 Feb 2011 in Hong
Kong. Cut off is defined for purchases before or after 20 November 2010, the specification al-
low differential linear trend function for properties purchased before and after 20 November
2010. Column (1) includes all transactions; Column (2) includes transactions that has no mort-
gage record associated; Column (3) includes transactions that has mortgage record associated.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of day of purchase.
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Table 3: RDD: HK SSD Phase 1, conditional holding duration
Outcome: Cond. holding duration
All No mortgage Mortgage
(1) (2) (3)
RD estimate=1 334.1∗∗∗ 371.3∗∗∗ 314.2∗∗∗
(18.98) (31.35) (21.77)
Observations 15650 4731 10919
Baseline mean 733.9 649.0 772.9
Notes: Outcome variable is the holding duration in days conditional on the property is resold
before 31st Dec 2015. Sample includes residential properties purchased from 20 Aug 2010-20
Feb 2011 in Hong Kong. Cut off is defined for purchases before or after 20 November 2010, the
specification allow differential linear trend function for properties purchased before and after
20 November 2010. Column (1) includes all transactions; Column (2) includes transactions that
has no mortgage record associated; Column (3) includes transactions that has mortgage record
associated. Standard errors are clustered at the level of day of purchase.
Table 4: RDD: Singapore SSD Phase 3
Outcome: Resold in 5 years
All HDB Private
(1) (2) (3)
RD estimate -0.0577∗∗∗ -0.0866∗∗∗ -0.0382∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0199) (0.0181)
Observations 6271 2487 3784
Notes: Sample includes residential properties purchased from 15 Dec 2010-15 Feb 2011 in Singa-
pore. Cut off is defined at purchased after 14 Jan 2011, the specification allow differential linear
trend function for properties purchased before and after 14 Jan 2011. Column (1) includes all
transactions; Column (2) includes transactions where the buyer address is from HDB housing;
Column (3) includes transactions where the buyer address is from private address. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of day of purchase.
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Table 5: Estimation of tax incidence
Ln of pre-tax price
(1) (2)
post=1 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.00137
(0.00469) (0.00175)
post=1 × sold < 6m=1 0.273∗∗∗ -0.0885∗∗∗
(0.0477) (0.0218)
post=1 × sold 6-12m=1 0.147∗∗∗ -0.0505∗∗
(0.0426) (0.0242)
post=1 × sold 1-2 years=1 -0.00948 -0.0103∗∗
(0.0127) (0.00452)
Observations 97017 94503
Year-month of sales FE Y Y
ln Rateable value*month FE N Y
ln Rateable value2*month FE N Y
Notes: Sample include properties bought between Jan 2009 and 26 Oct 2012, and are sold before
31 December 2015. post is an indicator for property bought between 20 Nov 2010 to 26 Oct
2012. Column (2) includes 2nd order polynomial of log rateable values and its interaction with
date of sales (Year-month) dummies. Standard errors are clustered at property level;
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Table 6: Robustness of price regression: polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
post=1 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.00182 -0.00137 -0.000824 -0.00102
(0.00469) (0.00181) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00175)
post=1 × sold < 6m=1 0.273∗∗∗ -0.0507∗∗ -0.0885∗∗∗ -0.0988∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗∗
(0.0477) (0.0225) (0.0218) (0.0220) (0.0220)
post=1 × sold 6-12m=1 0.147∗∗∗ -0.0306 -0.0505∗∗ -0.0549∗∗ -0.0566∗∗
(0.0426) (0.0247) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0243)
post=1 × sold 1-2 years=1 -0.00948 -0.00324 -0.0103∗∗ -0.0115∗∗ -0.0115∗∗
(0.0127) (0.00478) (0.00452) (0.00449) (0.00447)
Observations 97017 94503 94503 94503 94503
Degree of polynomial 0 1 2 3 4
Notes: See notes of Table 5. Column (2)-(5) controls for time varying polynomial of log rateable
value of properties with 1-4 degree respectively. Standard errors clustered at property level.
Table 7: SSD phase 1: selection in types of buyers
Outcome: Filing mortgage
Sample: before/after 20 Nov 2010
Sep10-Jan11 Aug10-Feb11 Jul10-Mar11 Jul09-Mar11 Jul09-Mar11
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After SSD 1=1 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0552∗∗
(0.00535) (0.00426) (0.00361) (0.00354) (0.0266)
Observations 30645 46335 64637 164551 164551
Baseline mean 0.687 0.696 0.699 0.688 0.688
District FE x x x x x
District*month of the year FE x x
Property FE x
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator of whether the transaction has an associate mortgage record. Column (1) contains sample of properties
purchased from 20 Sep 2010 to 20 Jan 2010; Column (2) contains sample of properties purchased from 20 Aug 2010 to 20 Feb 2010; Column (3)
contains sample of properties purchased from 20 Jul 2010 to 20 20 March 2010; Column (4) contains sample of properties purchased from 20 Jul
2009 to 20 20 March 2011; Sample includes residential properties purchased in the relevant period in Hong Kong. Standard errors clustered at
property level.
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A Appendix
Figure A.1: Timeline of the stamp duty tax policy change in Hong Kong since 2010
Figure A.2: Timeline of the Seller’s Stamp Duty policy change in Singapore since 2010
10 Feb 2010: 1st phase of 
seller stamp duty
30 Aug 2010: 2nd phase of
seller stamp duty
14 Jan 2011: 3rd Phase of
seller stamp duty
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Figure A.3: Property stamp duty tax schedule of Hong Kong in various time point
Note: Unit in thousands
Figure A.4: Changes in mortgage loan-to-value limit ratio
Note: For residential properties
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Figure A.5: Use of transaction tax on holding period in Asia
Note: The graph plots the region/country that had implemented transaction tax on residential
properties on holding period since 2010 in Asia, by the maximum transaction tax rate and when
the last notch of the tax applies, of each phase of it being implemented.
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Table A.1: Probability of selling within 2 years since purchases
Probability of selling in:
6 months 1 year 2 years
(1) (2) (3)
Mortgage -0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗
(0.00136) (0.00170) (0.00201)
Observations 201709 201709 201709
District FE x x x
Week of purchases FE x x x
Notes: Sample includes residential properties purchased between January 2009 to 19 November
2010. Outcome variable is an indicator of the property being resold within jth month since
purchase. Mortgage is an indicator for a transaction having an associated mortgage record.
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Figure A.6: RDD plot: Probability of resold in 3 years - by mortgage record
(a) With mortgage
(b) Without mortgage
Note: See note of Figure 2. Panel (a) plot the holdings in which there is an associated mortgage
record. Panel (b) plot the holdings in which there is no associated mortgage record.
Figure A.7: RDD: Singapore SSD Phase 3
Note: The graph plots the probability of a property being resold in 5 years since its purchased,
by the day they are last obtained. The vertical line represent 14 Jan 2011. The dotted line
are estimated linear trend in probability of resold in 5 years, separately for properties obtained
before and after 14 Jan 2011.
49
50
Figure A.8: Density of trading dates
(a) HK: All days (b) HK: Excluding weekend
(c) SG: All days (d) SG: Excluding weekend
Panel (a) and (b) plot the density of transaction in Hong Kong by days from 20 Nov 2010, with all days and excluding weekends respectively; Panel
(c) and (d) plot the density of transaction in Singapore by days from 20 Nov 2010, with all days and excluding weekends respectively.
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Figure A.9: Median price conditional on holding duration
(a) Median price
(b) Ln median price
Notes: The graph plots the median price (current price) and median log price of residential
properties traded at each holding period at week interval. The blue dots represent properties
purchased between Jan 2009 to 19 Nov 2010. The red dots represent properties purchased
between 20 Nov 2010 to 26 Oct 2012. The vertical lines represent holding period in which time
notch is present in the Hong Kong Special Stamp Duty Phase 1, at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years
intervals.
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Figure A.10: Ratio of transacted price and government estimated rental rate
Notes: The graph plots the relationship between transacted price and the government estimate
rateable values measured in 2015, for properties purchased and traded in 2009. It also shows
fitted line using 2nd order polynomial.
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Figure A.11: Estimated distribution of trading surplus
Note: The graph plots the estimated density of the trading surplus distribution using equation
15, using the 1st phase of Special Stamp Duty and the 3rd phase of the Seller’s Stamp Duty,
computed from the hazard rate of trade in the flat region in each of distinct period with different
tax rate within the same tax scheme. The red line plot the point estimates of the trading
surplus at {0, 0.050.1} using the trading hazard of properties purchased under the Special Stamp
Duty phase 1 in Hong Kong. The blue line plot the point estimates of the trading surplus at
{0, 0.04, 0.08, 0.12} using the trading hazard of properties purchased under the Seller’s Stamp
Duty phase 3 in Singapore.
A.1 Explanatory note for conceptual framework
Figure A.12: Illustration of trade off between waiting and trade immediately
u
H
H − u ≥ 0
H − u ≥ k(t)
H ≥ (1 + τ)u
H ≥ 1+τ
τθ
k(t)− 1−θ
θ
(1 + τ)u
W
T
NT
A
B
The area filled with dots is the strictly no trade area. The grey area represent the area
in which trading would not happen in a universal transaction tax at rate τ , but with the
time notch design bunching expand the possibility of trade; the light grey area represent
the case in which trading immediately dominates the bunching response. Area W and T
are trade would have happen, while all the cases in W would choose to wait until the
time notch instead of trading immediately.
When a transaction tax τ is introduced, only matches with surplus higher than τ
percent of the reservation value of seller are traded. This typically reduced the number
of transactions (i.e. area NT and B on the graph). However, with a specified time notch,
a newly created area B exist that would yield positive surplus if the buyer and seller wait
until t = t¯ to trade. The size of this area would depends on the utility cost of delaying
transaction kb + kv.
The dotted line with negative slope indicate the trade off of bunching versus trade
immediately even for those matches that would yield positive surplus if traded immedi-
ately. For matches that lies on the area W, both H and u are high, and thus the agreed
price after bargaining would also be high, this implies that the proportional tax would
be exceptionally costly for these transaction to happen. Therefore for matches in area W
(and B) they would wait until time t to trade to evade the tax.
On the other hand, on the left of the downward sloping dotted line, H and u are
smaller than those on the right, which implies a smaller price under Nash bargaining.
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The tax to evade is too small relative to the total unit cost of waiting kb + kv, and thus
for matches in area T (and A), trade would happen immediately.
When there is an exogenous increase in τ , area A and T would decrease, but the cutoff
H−u ≥ k(t) remains unchanged, and thus area of B (and also W) would indeed increase.
Increase the tax rate would increase the number of people who wait until t¯ to trade.
A.2 Proofs for the conceptual framework
Proposition 1
To see proposition 1, assume an arbitrary joint distribution of H and u - g(h, u), and
the density of match formation at time t - f(t). Note that for every pair of H and u,
we can map it into a price p. Then we can define the density of the conditional price
distribution of p, the price distribution undistored by the tax conditional on H − u >
(kb+kv)(T − t)∩H−u > 0, as P (p, k, t). Then there is a critical price where the amount
of buncher is given by the mass of price where for each time t being greater than pd(τ, t, k)
pd(τ, t, k)∆τt = (kb + kv)(t¯− t) (16)
Thus the amount of buncher is
B =
∫ t¯
0
∫ ∞
pd(τ,t,k)
P (p, k, t)Prob(H − u > (kb + kv)(T − t))dp f(t)dt (17)
dB
d(kv + kb)
=
∫ t¯
0
−P (pd(H, u, τ, t, k)) dpd
d(kv + kb)
f(t)dt+∫ t¯
0
∫ ∞
pd(τ,t,k)
P (p, k, t)
dProb(H − u > (kb + kv)(T − t))
d(kv + kb)
dp f(t)dt (18)
where
∫ t¯
0
−P (pd(H, u, τ, t, k)) dpdd(kv+kb) f(t)dt < 0 as
dpd
d(kv+kb)
> 0, and dProb(H−u>(kb+kv)(T−t))
d(kv+kb)
dp <
0. Thus if kv + kb is smaller, then the amount of bunchers is larger.
Propositions 2
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We prove the case where τt¯ = 0
Define (1 + τ)u = L(τ, u) and 1+τ
τθ
k(t)− 1−θ
θ
(1 + τ)u) = U(τ, t, u) and some arbitrary
joint distribution of H and u - g(h, u)
Probability of trade at time t =
Prob(L(τ, U) < H < U(τ, t, θ, u))∫ k(t)
τ
0
∫ U(τ,t,θ,u)
L(τ,U)
g(h, u)dhdu
(19)
Since the upper bound of the two integrals are decreasing in t, where the joint density is
strictly positive and independent of t, we have dProb(L(τ,U)<H<U(τ,t,θ,u))
dt
< 0
Probability of forgone trade at time t =
∫ ∞
k(t)
τ
∫ k(t)+u
u
g(h, u)dhdu+
∫ k(t)
τ
0
∫ (1+τ)u
u
g(h, u)dhdu
(20)
where dProb(forgone)
dt
=
∫∞
k(t)
τ
g(k(t) + u, u)k′(t)dhdu < 0
which is decreasing with t
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A.3 Explanatory note on the bunching estimates
Define the distribution of timing of arrival of a match (q) for a seller is L(t) = Prob(q ≤ t),
then the density of the time of sales is
P (T ≤ t) =Prob(q ≤ t)Prob(H − u > 0)
=L(t)
∫
H−u>0
dG(H, u)
=F (t)
Define f(t) as the pdf of F(t)
f(t) = l(t)
∫
H−u>0
dG(H, u)
and g(t) as
g(t) = l(t)
∫
H−u>τu
dG(H, u)
Then the expected waiting duration could be estimated using Bˆ,fˆ(t¯) and gˆ(t¯)
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B =P (T = t) ∈ {
¯
B, B¯}
B¯ =
∫ t¯
0
Prob(q ≥ t(H, u) ∩H − u > 0)dL(q)
=
∫ t¯
0
∫
q≥t(H,u)∩H−u>0
dG(H, u)dL(q)
=
∫ t¯
0
∫
H−u>0
I[q ≥ t(H, u)]dG(H, u)dL(q)
=
∫
H−u>0
∫ t¯
0
I[q ≥ t(H, u)]dL(q)dG(H, u)
=
∫
H−u>0
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
dL(q)dG(H, u)
≈
∫
H−u>0
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
l(t¯)dqdG(H, u)
=
∫
H−u>0
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
dqdG(H, u)l(t¯)
=
∫
H−u>0
[t¯− t(H, u)]dG(H, u)l(t¯)
=
∫
H−u>0
[t¯− t(H, u)] dG(H, u)∫
H−u>0 dG(H, u)
l(t¯)
∫
H−u>0
dG(H, u)
=E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > 0)l(t¯)
∫
H−u>0
dG(H, u)
=E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > 0)f(t¯)
and
¯
B =
∫ t¯
0
Prob(q ≥ t(H, u) ∩H − u > τu)dL(q)
=E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu)g(t¯)
This implies
E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > 0) ≥ Bˆ
f(t¯)
and
58
E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) ≤ Bˆ
g(t¯)
And as p(τ,H, u)τ = t¯− t(H, u)
E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) = E(p(τ,H, u)τ |H − u > τu)
= τE(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
= τ
E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗ E(p|H − u > 0)
≥ τ E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗ E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > 0)
=
E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗ E(τp(τ,H, u)|H − u > 0)
=
E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗ E(t− t(H, u)|H − u > 0)
≥ E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗
B
f(t¯)
Thus
Bˆ
g(t¯)
≥ E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) ≥ E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗
B
f(t¯)
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A.4 Explanatory notes on welfare analysis
The welfare cost of having traders wait for the time notch is represented by the term
∫ t¯
0
∫
W,B
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) (21)
This could be reduced to
∫ t¯
0
∫
W,B
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) =
≥
∫ t¯
0
∫
W
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t)
=
∫
H−u≥τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t)
= (kb + kv)
∫
H−u≥τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
(t¯− t)dL˜(t)dG(H, u)
≈ (kb + kv)
∫
H−u≥τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
(t¯− t)l(t¯)dG(H, u)
= (kb + kv)l(t¯)
∫
H−u≥τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
(t¯− t)dtdG(H, u)
= (kb + kv)l(t¯)
∫
H−u≥τu
(t¯− t)2
2
dG(H, u)
= (kb + kv)l(t¯)E(
(t¯− t)2
2
|H − u ≥ τu) ∗
∫
H−u>τu
dG(H, u)
≥ (kb + kv)l(t¯)E((t¯− t)|H − u ≥ τu))
2
2
∗
∫
H−u>τu
dG(H, u)
= (kb + kv)
E((t¯− t)|H − u ≥ τu))2
2
∗
∫
H−u>τu
dG(H, u)l(t¯)
which is the expression in the main text, and conceptually excluding those traders
with surplus less than τu but who chose to trade at t¯.
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B Data appendix
Hong Kong
• Source The data used in this paper originated from the Memorial Day Book pro-
vided directly by The Land Registry of Hong Kong, and standardized by the author.
• Transaction Record The data used in this paper contains the ”Agreement of
Sales and Purchases” and its variations in the Memorial Day Book.
• Sample construction The data used in the current version of the paper does
not include transactions that has multiple unit of real estate properties transacted
in one single contract that constitute very small amount of all the contracts. The
original data contains transactions of all real estate properties that are chargeable
for stamp duty, that include properties for all uses including for example car parks
and lands; the residential sample used in the current version of the paper is deter-
mined by the full address with official list of residential estates and other publicly
available information, supplemented by information from the Rating and Valuation
Department.
• Date of purchase The date of purchase is defined as the day in which the contract
is signed, instead of the day it arrives in the Land Registry, under the column of
”Date of Instrument” as opposed to ”Date of Delivery”. If there is a provisional
agreement appears in the Memorial Day Book for the same property under the
exact same price of formal agreement of sales and purchases and there is no other
formal agreement of sales and purchased between the provisional agreement and
the formal agreement in which it has the exact same price, it is considered as under
the same transaction. The day of purchases is thus corrected for the day in which
the provisional agreement is signed.
• Mortgage record For mortgages approved by financial institution, the Land Reg-
istry contains an entry and it appears in the Memorial Day Book. The description
of mortgage entry in the Memorial Day Book allows identification between first
time mortgage of the property, and for those transaction in which there is a mort-
gage entry record appearing in the 3 months that follows, before any other formal
transaction record appears, it is defined as associated with a mortgage record.
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Singapore
• The transaction in which a property is transacted on the same day with exact same
price is omitted from the data which is likely due to an entry mistakes in the original
data from the Urban Redevelopment Board, a procedure also applied in Giglio et al.
(2015)
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